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and misery in all its forms, or by preventive checks upon excessive births, could the world's population be kept within the bounds of the world's food supply. During the nineteenth century England's people increased fourfold, Germany's threefold, and the population of the European continent as a whole rose from 200,000,000 to 400,000,000. Had it not been for the opening up of huge new food-producing areas in North and South America, Australia, and Africa, the pressure of population on food supply would have become acute early in the nineteenth century.

THE QUESTION OF POPULATION

The population of the world, which in 1810 was estimated to be six hundred and eighty-two million people, has risen to about one billion seven hundred millions and is increasing annually by about fifteen millions per annum. At this rate, of about 1 per cent per annum, it will double in about sixty-five years. The threat to life of insufficient food supply was not ignored by the human life instinct, nor yet dealt with by human reason. The readjustment of population to food supply was not left blindly to the positive checks, such as starvation, disease, war, and misery, nor were the preventive checks upon excessive births consciously, knowingly, publicly applied. Instinctively, subconsciously, and silently life protects itself against destruction. Since the middle of the nineteenth century the birth rate has declined in all civilized countries and is still falling. In England it fell from 35 per thousand per annum, in the decade from 1850 to 1860 to 27 per thousand from 1900 to 1905; in France from 26 per thousand to 21, and in Germany from 36 or 37 to 33 or 34. The population of France is already stationary, while England's population will probably be stationary by the middle of this century.

In general, the marriage rate in most countries, though it shows a slight tendency to decline, has varied little. It is usually not far from eight per thousand. Any individual couple, if asked why it has deliberately chosen to have fewer children than its ancestors, would, of course, not ascribe its choice to a realization that the world's population was increasing faster than the food supply. The high cost of living, they would probably mention, due to the increasing pressure of population on food supply. In the nineteenth century the human-life instinct, threatened by an adequate food supply, has subconsciously adjusted itself to its changed environment. In the twentieth century the same most powerful of all instincts, threatened by modern war with the extermination of human life, has set to work to abolish war before war destroys life.

PEACE INEVITABLE

It thus appears that an examination of the fundamental facts of human life on earth compels the conclusion that international peace is ultimately inevitable. Is the intelligence and insight of our twentieth century sufficient to abolish war, or will much more murderous wars than the recent one be required to demonstrate to the great mass of men the vital necessity of establishing international peace? That is the question.

THE OPEN DOOR

Its History and Conflict with Spheres of Interest

By DAVID D. O'DARE

ON SEPTEMBER 6, 1899, John Hay, Secretary of State, instructed the United States ambassadors at London, Berlin, St. Petersburg, Rome, and Tokyo to get, if possible, a declaration in favor of the Open Door policy with regard to their respective spheres of interest in China. This move was the first enunciation of a benevolent and considerate note in the relation of foreign nations to China and represents the nucleus around which our Far Eastern policy has developed. The original items of the policy to which John Hay sought the adherence of interested powers were three:

- (1) Assurance that no nation having a sphere of interest or a lease on territory in China would interfere with treaty ports or vested interests in her territory.
- (2) Like tariff rates for all nations within the spheres of interest, tariff to be collected by China.
- (3) Equal harbor dues and railroad charges for all nations.

NECESSITY FOR POLICY

Such a policy was necessary to protect the trade and commerce of the United States in China. In 1895, at the close of the Chino-Japanese War, a "scramble for concessions" on the part of European nations began. Japan took as spoils of her victory Formosa, the Pescadores, and South Manchuria. Russia, however, objected to Japan's presence in South Manchuria, and, supported by France and Germany, succeeded in forcing the recession of this territory to China. Japan was successful, however, in obtaining a non-alienation treaty, which amounted to obtaining a sphere of interest, in her mind if not in the mind of China's statesmen, regarding the rich province of Fukien. France obtained concessions on the frontier of her colony, Indo-China. As a compensation for France's concession and in order to protect her sea-going trade, England sought and gained a concession of lands on the North Burma frontier and some new ports in South China. In addition, she obtained a non-alienation treaty covering the Yangtze Valley, which is the territory feeding into Hongkong, the commercial center ceded to her by China at the end of the Opium War. Russia was granted railroad and financial privileges in northern Manchuria and Port Arthur. On a flimsy pretext, Germany leased Kiaochow Bay and obtained the right of railroad construction in Shantung province as well as mining and financial concessions.

In general, the term "concession" expressed the granting of rights to construct and administer railroads, right of priority in enterprises to develop the country, and right to be first consulted regarding loans affecting the territory concerned. "Spheres of interest express a principle that no other power except the one in whose favor the sphere of interest exists shall be permitted to acquire concessions or to exert any control or interest whatso-

ever, . . . at the same time giving the privileged power a monopoly of the right to seek concession."¹

ASSENT OF NATIONS

In due course all the nations assented, more or less guardedly, to the principles set forth by John Hay. Great Britain was strongly in favor of such a policy, since, as chief trader with China, closed ports or discrimination in tariff, harbor dues, or railroad charges would decrease her trading advantages outside her own sphere of interest. Previous to the enunciation of the Open Door policy by Secretary Hay, Lord Charles Beresford had made a report on economic conditions in China and had recommended that the United States and Great Britain unite in upholding such a policy.² Perhaps Secretary Hay would not have sponsored the diplomatic stroke he did had he not been reasonably sure of England's support. The other nations could not well declare themselves opposed to the policy, and so stated their tentative consent, depending on the action of the other powers. Russia's consent was very necessary, due to her influential position in northern Manchuria. Russia would sign no statement assenting to the Open Door policy nor any restriction of her action in China, but her foreign minister, Count Mouravieff, had promised to do whatever France did. Evidently the minister had not expected France to declare herself in favor of such a policy, for on learning that such was the case he "flew into a passion and insisted that Russia would never bind herself in that way."³ But Hay acted on the Count's promise and considered that Russia, too, had bound herself to these agreements.

After allowing a short time to elapse, Hay informed the governments concerned that the policy had received the assent of all interested nations and that the United States would consider the matter settled. Thus, the first stroke was achieved. There was nothing in the nature of treaties, but the notes exchanged were formal declarations of a policy subscribed to by the various interested nations.

HAY'S SUCCESS

Secretary Hay's success in securing the adherence of the seven powers to a policy which sponsored equal economic opportunity for all nations, which aimed at preserving the commercial *status quo* of China, and which recognized China's right to administer her own internal affairs and collect her own customs is signal. The very powers who had vied with each other between 1895 and 1898 to secure concessions and spheres of interest in China could not refuse to support a fair and just policy when asked to do so by a nation whose policy had been consistently fair and just. Although any of them, with the exception of England, would doubtless have preferred to exploit her own sphere of interest to the exclusion of other commercial interests, none could openly state such a policy.

¹ Overlach: Foreign Financial Control in China, page v.

² Beresford: The Breakup of China.

³ Thayer: The Life and Letters of John Hay, Vol. II, page 243.

SPHERES OF INTEREST

From the three proposals which constitute the first statement of the Open Door policy it may be seen that spheres of interest are recognized. It merely safeguarded the right of all nations to economic equality within the sphere of interest. In principle, however, the policies, even at the outset, were widely separated. The Open Door meant equal economic opportunity for all nations; it upheld treaty obligations and rights; it recognized China's interests. The sphere of interest policy had its origin in the period when European nations resolved to solve the Far Eastern problem by effecting the partition of China. Each of the great powers had felt that she must have a slice in the pie, and her motive for taking it was by no stretch of imagination altruistic. While it is true that the United States in advancing the Open Door policy had in mind commercial advantages for her citizens, it is also true that she recognized China's rights as well. The Open Door has led to the preservation of the territorial integrity of China by its persistence for the commercial *status quo*; the spheres of interest developed in the direction of spheres of influence, a term which "suggests a certain degree of authority or control, either financial or political, exercised by a foreign power over a certain territory."⁴

BOXER UPRISING AND EFFECT

Scarcely had Hay succeeded in obtaining assent to the Open Door policy when the Boxer uprising against foreigners occurred, in the spring of 1900. During the attack Secretary Hay added another touch to the policy of the United States in China which has become coupled with that of the Open Door. Feeling it advisable to define the position of the United States, he sent an identical telegram to eleven nations, stating that our purpose was to "act in concurrence with the other powers—the policy of the United States is to seek a solution which may bring about permanent safety and peace to China, preserve Chinese territorial and administrative entity, protect all rights guaranteed to friendly powers by treaty and international law, and safeguard for the world the principle of equal and impartial trade with all parts of the Chinese Empire."

This statement helped model the terms of settlement at the end of the Boxer ordeal. Due to the strong position of the United States,⁵ China was not partitioned and the Open Door policy was observed. China, weak and in the toils of political upheaval, would with difficulty have resisted any measure agreed upon by the powers, but their concurrence in the policy outlined by Secretary Hay allowed the unwieldy nation to work toward a solution of her internal problems without added foreign difficulties. By a brilliant stroke of diplomacy, executed daringly and backed by moral force alone, the Open Door and territorial integrity became the acknowledged policies of all interested powers.

RUSSIA'S ATTITUDE

Russia, whose assent to the Open Door policy had been

⁴ Overlach: Foreign Financial Control in China, page v.

⁵ Hornbeck: Contemporary Politics in the Far East, page 237.

obtained almost by a ruse on the part of Secretary Hay, soon showed that she did not regard it seriously. The end of the Boxer uprising found Russia with fifty garrisons in Manchuria. Realizing their advantage, the Russians tried to negotiate a separate peace with China, giving her "general powers of control" over Mukden and military command of Chinese forces in Manchuria. With the support of England, Japan, and the United States, China was able to refuse such a flagrant usurpation of her sovereignty in Manchuria. Russia, however, continued to seek special and favorable terms, and in 1901 was on the point of securing concessions in Manchuria which would almost reduce the province to a Russian protectorate.⁶

Secretary Hay dispatched a note to the eleven interested nations, stating the United States as unequivocally opposed to the cession "to any corporation or company the exclusive right and privilege of opening mines, establishing railroads, or in any other way industrially developing China." This position was taken on the grounds that such a concession "constitutes a monopoly"; "is a distinct breach of the stipulations of treaties" existing; "restricts American trade" and exposes it to being discriminated against; "precipitates demands for similar cessions by other nations; conflicts with the assurances repeatedly conveyed to this government by the imperial Russian ministry."⁷ Russia, under pressure of the sentiment of the United States, Great Britain, and Japan, promised to withdraw from Manchuria and to restore railroads temporarily held by her to China.

However, Russia's course of action in 1902 did not accord with her promise. Troops were withdrawn from the garrisons, merely to be stationed along the railroads as guards. New propositions for privileges in Siberia were being advanced, and, unaided, China could not hope to resist them. During 1903 Russia's policy continued and emphasized this aggressive note. Additional troops were introduced into Manchuria; demands for non-alienation of Manchuria followed demands for assurance of compensation for any territory which might in the future be conceded to England; arrangements for favorable and discriminatory tariff rates were attempted.

JAPAN'S FEARS

These movements conflicted with the policy of commercial expansion toward the northern markets adopted by the United States and Great Britain, and Russia's failure to evacuate Manchuria aroused Japan's fears. Japan, situated across a narrow channel from Russia's sphere of interest, Manchuria; Japan, already looking with covetous eyes at Korea, which was too near the insidious reaching out of Russia for safety; Japan, who had been forced to give back to China in 1895 the very territory in which Russia was now using every means to secure a permanent foothold; Japan, of course, was most vitally interested. Perhaps an additional reason for the fact that Japan took the decisive step at this crisis instead of the United States may have been the loss of John Hay's influence as Secretary of State. His illness

and death (1903-04) deprived the United States of a great statesman, who had recognized the significance of the position of the United States in world politics and the importance of the Far East in future commerce.

So it was Japan who called Russia to a halt in her Manchuria policy. In the summer of 1903 Baron Komura formulated and dispatched a set of proposals in nature resembling a bargain. For effect, perhaps, the first clause affirms the Open Door and territorial integrity. The following clauses state that Japan will recognize Russia in Manchuria, provided Russia will not interfere with Japan in Korea. In a series of notes Russia stated her position; she desired Japan to give her a free hand in Manchuria and arrogantly pressed recognition of her first interest there. Japan, though not unwilling to do this, still would not without like recognition of her interests in Korea. Russia's insolence went a step too far with Japan, and to the former's great surprise Japan broke off diplomatic relations and declared war in February, 1904.

JAPAN'S TREATIES

Japan, who had waged war in the name of the Open Door, was successful in obtaining a treaty which undoubtedly conflicts with the principle of it. The Treaty of Portsmouth, signed in December, 1905, recognized Japan's paramount interest in Korea and virtually gave to her Russia's interests in southern Manchuria. Russia stated as a part of the treaty that she had no concessions in Manchuria incompatible with the Open Door policy. However, Japan made a set of secret protocols which was ratified by China along with the Portsmouth Treaty. On these agreements Japan later based her right to exclude China, England, and the United States from building railways in Manchuria. Such an action was unquestionably in conflict with the Open Door of commercial enterprise in China, as well as opposed to Japan's public avowals of her policy with regard to equal opportunity in Manchuria.

"The close of the war left Russia in *North* Manchuria and found Japan ensconced as a successor to what had been Russia's rights in *South* Manchuria. There were thus *two* foreign powers where there had been *one*, with spheres of interest in Manchuria. Russia, before the war, had failed to live up to her Open Door pledges."⁸ Japan had stated her adherence to the Open Door afresh, but had violated it in the secret protocols of the treaty.⁹

COURSE OF ROOSEVELT AND KNOX

In 1908 President Roosevelt, alarmed at Japan's aggressive policy in Manchuria, sought and obtained an assurance that it was the wish of both governments to encourage commerce in the Pacific, to preserve the *status quo* in China, to maintain the Open Door and territorial integrity, and to co-operate in any event threatening to alter these conditions. Again, in 1909-10, Secretary Knox protested against the situation of Russia and Japan in Manchuria; but, since Great Britain did

⁶ Hornbeck: Contemporary Politics in the Far East, page 245.

⁷ Quotations from Secretary Hay's note of February 1, 1902.

⁸ Hornbeck: Contemporary Politics in the Far East, page 255.

⁹ Japan in Korea is not discussed here, partly because of the limited scope of the paper and partly because Korea, strictly speaking, was not a sphere of interest. Her independence had been recognized by China in 1895.

not take measures to support the action against her ally, Japan, no result was gained. Here, as before, the protest of the United States had only moral force.

In the interim between 1905 and the beginning of the World War Japan strengthened herself in her spheres of interest, South Manchuria and Fukien; English trade diminished proportionately to other nations; the trade of the United States and Japan in China assumed larger proportions.

Soon after the outbreak of the war Japan declared war against the Central Powers as the defensive ally of Great Britain. An ultimatum was immediately sent Germany demanding the withdrawal of German vessels from Pacific waters and transference of German interests in Shantung to Japan. Germany complied to the first demand, destroying a great deal of English shipping as she went, but surrendered Kiaochow and Tsingtao only when Japan's invading army forced her to do so.

Whether Japan's action in Shantung was in accord with international policy in her disregard of China's request that spheres of interest be neutralized for the period of the war; in her invasion of neutral territory in Shantung; in her assumption of privileges in Kiaochow and Shantung greater than Germany had ever enjoyed; or whether, as eminent Japanese statesmen have repeatedly declared, her actions were wholly motivated by ideals held by the Allies and were untinted by any desire for aggrandizement, it is useless to speculate. At the time the United States made no official protest, since Japan prefaced every new aggression with the phrase, "with the view of the eventual restoration of Shantung to China." The fact that Japan sought special concessions regarding the collection of customs, that special privileges were granted a Japanese steamship line to enter Tsing-tao when to all other nations it was a closed port; that China's administrative power in the interior part of the province was infringed upon, would appear, however, to be in direct violation of the Open Door and territorial integrity, in spite of Japan's assurance of her devotion to these very policies.

THE TWENTY-ONE DEMANDS

In 1915 Japan addressed twenty-one demands to the Chinese Government. In very general terms, the demands were for: (1) options on loans and railways, (2) veto power with regard to actions of the Chinese Government, and (3) a position of definite, immediate, and important privilege in southern Manchuria, Shantung, and Fukien.¹⁰ From the text of these demands it is not difficult to pick out clauses which impair the administrative entity of China.

"The Chinese Government agrees to grant to Japanese officials and common people the mining rights of all mines in South Manchuria and eastern inner Mongolia." (Section II, Article 4.)

Consent of the Japanese Government is necessary before "permission is granted to a subject of a third power to build a railway in South Manchuria or eastern Mongolia and before a loan is to be made with a third power pledging local taxes of South Manchuria or eastern Mongolia as security." (Section II, Article 5, a and b.)

"The Chinese Government engages not to cede or lease to a third power any harbor, bay, or island along the coast of China." (Section IV, preamble.)

The significance of the demands is far-reaching. Had they been promulgated in time of peace, it seems hardly possible that nations pledged to support a policy of equal opportunity in China's commercial fields, as well as her administrative and territorial entity, would have allowed Japan to force them upon China. The Allies, however, took no action against Japan, one of their own members, and Secretary Bryan let the situation pass with another wordy assurance from Japan that her intentions were good.

WILSON'S COURSE AT VERSAILLES

At Versailles, President Wilson succeeded in incorporating the Open Door policy with respect to mandatories in the text of the League of Nations. Before applied only to the Philippines and to China in particular, this represents another triumph for the policy.

THE FUTURE

If a course of action could be chosen for the future, we would be compelled to choose the Open Door as opposed to spheres of interest, if we used as a test the results to be expected from each. Spheres of interest breed international jealousy and desire for compensatory concessions when a single nation gains a concession. Selfish exploitation of a province granted as a sphere of interest is the rule, and progress toward the dismemberment of China has undoubtedly begun under the sphere-of-interest policy. On the other hand, the Open Door stands for concerted action by the powers, for equal economic competition, for respect toward China's interest.

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¹⁰ Hornbeck: *Contemporary Politics in the Far East*, page 312.

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PROCESSION FOR THE PEACE YEAR—1921

By EDNA LOGAN HUMMEL

Here, on the rugged bluff, from whence there gleams
The river, gray beneath the sunlit hills,
And trees on which the kiss of Glory falls
Till all their number thrill with vivid hues,
I watch a long procession in array
Of Autumn's gold and scarlet uniforms,
Bearing this fateful year to his long home.

And lo, you pass, old Year, as one who goes
Not to an unremembered grave, where lies
The far, dim land of long-forgotten times;
Nor yet to those scarred sepulchres of hate
Where spectral horrors stalk the haunted mind;
But, sweeping forward o'er the bannered hills,
The pageant of your passing moves along
Triumphant to a goal of honor bright
In Memory's trophied hall; for you have brought
Into the heart of man a long-sought hope,
Such hope as women, weeping o'er their slain,
Have prayed for since the days of Eve; such hope
As war-torn heroes, knowing how all vain
Their costly victories were 'gainst future wars,
Strove hard to realize.

Methinks when from

Some bold Judean height the seer beheld
The future, clear as panoramic hills,
He trembled, all amazed to see afar
The white mists pierced by crimson streaks of dawn
Aquiver in the west, and morning star
Of peace rise in the blue. Perchance today
That seer has place in this vast conference
Now planning world-wide peace, and strangely thrills
To see his ancient prophecy fulfilled.

Bright Year, farewell! The alabaster box
Of international sacrifice you hold
To bathe a world whose blood-stained feet have trod
A bitter winepress, till that autumn day
When Peace, victorious, flings her glowing robes
Around you, happy Year, and bids you go,
Thus panoplied, to glory evermore.

DISCOURAGEMENTS AT THE HAGUE

Thus far, little has been reported from the experts' conference on Russia at The Hague to dispel the gloom of those in this country, officials and others, who said the sessions would be a continuation of the Genoa Conference, and would offer little prospect of genuine improvement in the relations between Russia and the balance of Europe. The conference has been a series of threatened breaks.

Some weeks before the sessions at The Hague started, there was a tart exchange of notes between France and Great Britain. On June 1 Premier Poincaré in a note to the British Government reviewed the French theories and position, demanding that the Soviet Government withdraw its note of May 11 and reiterating that political and diplomatic questions should be avoided at The Hague. The deduction frequently made from M. Poincaré's note was that he thought the powers, through their experts, should formulate a scheme of Russian reconstruction, and then lay it before the Russian delegates. The British began their reply by saying the French note showed some confusion of thought and unfamiliarity with the ground covered at Genoa. It proceeded more or less along the lines Mr. Lloyd-George has laid down frequently—co-operation, acceptance of the fact of the Soviet Government's authority in Russia, and treatment of the problems in the light of expediency. On June 12 M. Poincaré sent a rejoinder to the British, in which he intimated that confusion of thought plagued the British rather than the French.

MEETING OF THE PREMIERS

So things remained, with great expectations arising in some sections of British and French thought, from the scheduled meeting of Lloyd-George and Poincaré in London in connection with the latter's visit for the Verdun celebration. Hope of consummation of the long-discussed Anglo-French pact was stimulated greatly in advance, as an incident of the meeting, and of the desired co-operation between the two nations, but the news that followed the meeting did not bear out the hopes. On the contrary, representative newspapers in both Great Britain and France found little satisfaction in the results of the Lloyd-George-Poincaré conference.

The *Manchester Guardian* took occasion to speak plainly to France on the subject of her stiff and insistent demands on Germany, her continued expenditures, her failure to increase taxes, and the maintenance of her army, described as "enormously greater than any present dangers can justify." The *Daily Chronicle*, semi-official organ of Lloyd-George, said that "if Poincaré hopes for conclusion of an Anglo-French pact, he should understand that this project is today far below the horizon. He should understand that it is the French policy of the last six months under his direction which has led to the eclipse of the project of the pact." And *L'Oeuvre*, considered by many an intelligent and independent liberal French paper, had this to say on the results of the Premier's conference:

Hague Conference—nothing.
Interallied debts—nothing.
Anglo-French pact—nothing.
Reparations—left with Reparation Commission, and, if necessary, to conference.
Tangler—left to conference.
Near East—left to conference.